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The EU Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings: The Need for a Modified
Universal Approach
By JULLY PAE*
Introduction
The growth of international business activity has experienced a
parallel growth in the number of cross-border insolvencies] When a
multinational corporation becomes insolvent, the courts of multiple
jurisdictions are implicated and as such, conflict-of-law issues arise.2
A number of competing theories purport to offer the best means of
achieving the level of international cooperation necessary to
overcome the complex problems cross-border insolvencies pose.3 The
first and most widely discussed theory is known as "universalism.
' 4
At its core, universalism requires recognition of a foreign court's
extraterritorial jurisdiction.5 It is a system where one court applies its
state bankruptcy law and administers all the assets of an insolvent
multinational corporation, wherever located.' However, this
approach is not a workable solution because states are generally
unwilling to enforce the laws of foreign courts against their own local
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004.
1. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000) (stating that the growth of international business has
brought with it a growth in the number of international business failures).
2. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); see also Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy
Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31 (2001).
3. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999).
4. See Tung, supra note 2, at 32-33.
5. Id. at 35, 49.
6. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default:
Chapter 15, the ALl Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1, 6 (2002).
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parties.'
Universalism may be theoretically ideal for purposes of
international cooperation, but support for the system has waned
within the bankruptcy community. Attention has shifted to other
theories such as modified universalism, cooperative territoriality, and
contractualism to address the issues involved in cross-border
insolvency.8 Of these theories, modified universalism provides the
most workable system for international cooperation. It lacks the rigid
requirements of universalism (in particular, the demand for foreign
recognition) and works within the universalist paradigm of a unified
administration of assets.9
Despite modified universalism's numerous advantages, not all
attempts at establishing international insolvency regimes have
undertaken this approach. One such attempt is the European Union
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings1 ° (EU Regulation), which
became effective on May 31, 2002. The EU Regulation is based on
universalist principles but, in effect, is really a hybrid between
universalism and territorialism: in addition to a main proceeding, it
allows for the opening of a secondary, or territorial, proceeding in
states where a debtor's assets are located.11 The EU Regulation's
prospects for success would be enhanced, however, if it eliminated
secondary proceedings and instead pursued a strictly modified
universalist approach. By doing so, the EU Regulation would further
its universalist goals of a unified administration of assets while
maintaining a level of flexibility that would allow it to work within the
present "multi-forum, multi-law" world.12
Part I of this paper examines the advantages and disadvantages
of universalism. Part II discusses other competing theories to
universalism and explains why modified universalism provides the
most workable solution to address the difficult issues of cross-border
insolvency. Part III examines the EU Regulation, focusing on its
inherent flaws and why it falls short of modified universalism.
7. See Tung, supra note 2, at 33.
8. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 725-28, 737, 742-43; Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2298-99, 2302-09
(2000).
9. See Westbrook, supra note 6, at 9.
10. Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) [hereinafter Council
Regulation].
11. Id. art. 27.
12. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2302.
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I. Universalism
When a multinational corporation becomes insolvent, two
difficult questions arise: (1) which court and whose law will apply and
(2) what happens to the debtor's assets.13 Even though the insolvent
corporation has assets in more than one country, the ideal situation
would be a single, unified distribution of assets. 4 This is the core of
universalism, the idea that a single court administers the entirety of
the assets of the insolvent corporation wherever located. 5 The
jurisdiction of that court would be determined either by the place of
incorporation or the corporation's "home country," that is, the center
of the debtor's main interest. 6 The home country would apply its
own bankruptcy laws and control the administration of the debtor's
assets to creditors worldwide.17
A. Advantages of Universalism
The primary purposes of a bankruptcy proceeding are "to
maximize asset value and to distribute proceeds" in an equitable
manner. 8 Universalism purports to satisfy both these purposes based
on its claimed advantages of efficiency, fairness, and predictability.' 9
A single court administering the entirety of the debtor's assets
maximizes asset value as a result of a more efficient distribution) °
Because assets will be distributed in a single, rather than multiple,
proceeding, there will be a reduction in administrative costs, leaving
more proceeds to distribute to creditors.2'
This distribution of assets is fair and equitable because
universalism does not distinguish between local and foreign
creditors. 2  Instead, assets are distributed on a pro rata basis. 2
13. Brian M. Devling, The Continuing Vitality of the Territorial Approach to
Cross-Border Insolvency, 70 UMKC L. REV. 435,436 (2001).
14. Id. at 436-37.
15. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 699.
16. Id. at 704.
17. Id. at 699.
18. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2285.
19. See Wolfgang Leucke, The New European Law on International Insolvencies:
A German Perspective, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 369, 373; see Devling, supra note 13, at
437.
20. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 706; see also Tung, supra note 2, at 41.
21. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 707; see also Tung, supra note 2, at 41.
22. See Devling, supra note 13, at 437.
23. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 708.
2004]
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Knowing how the assets of a corporation will be distributed in the
event of insolvency is important for potential lenders considering
loans to a multinational corporation.24 Moreover, a universal system
is more predictable ex ante to potential lenders because there can
only be one home country.2' This increased predictability has the
effect of lowering the cost of credit for corporations and stimulates
foreign investment since foreign creditors would be more willing to
invest in a corporation whose insolvency laws treated foreign and
local creditors equally.26
B. Disadvantages of Universalism
Despite the advantages of universalism and its intellectual
appeal, it is not adaptable to the realities of cross-border insolvency.
2 7
Before the rise of the multinational corporation, bankruptcy
proceedings were wholly domestic matters.2 As such, each state's
bankruptcy laws reflected the culture of its individual legal system
and particular social policies.29 With the advent of globalization and
multinational corporations, the effects of cross-border insolvency
generated the need for a global insolvency law.30 However, because
bankruptcy law is closely tied to national politics, it is among the
areas of law "least amenable to international harmonization or
cooperation."'" Even universalists recognize that universalism is not
likely to emerge in the foreseeable future given the present climate of
national politics and prevailing notions of sovereignty.32
Professor Frederick Tung provides two primary reasons why
bankruptcy is among the least amenable areas of law.33 First,
bankruptcy has wholesale effects.-4 Not only does bankruptcy law
encompass the comprehensive restructuring of an insolvent
corporation and all of its legal relationships with creditors, it
24. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2286.
25. Id.; Tung, supra note 2, at 41.
26. See Tung, supra note 2, at 41; Devling, supra note 13, at 435.
27. Tung, supra note 2, at 36-37.
28. See Guzman, supra note 1, at 2177.
29. See Tung, supra note 2, at 48.
30. See Westbrook, supra note 6, at 8.
31. Tung, supra note 2, at 47; see also Manfred Balz, The European Union
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (1996).
32. Tung, supra note 2, at 41-42.
33. Id. at 47-49.
34. Id. at 47.
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overrides all other legal rights, including those outside bankruptcy
law. 3' Because of these wholesale effects and their impact on
domestic social policies, states are inevitably unwilling to cooperate in
a system based on deferring to the jurisdiction of a foreign court
applying its own laws. 36
Second, bankruptcy raises jurisdictional issues, which are
exacerbated in a universalist system that requires the recognition and
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.37  Because a state's
bankruptcy laws reflect its own social policies, assertion of
extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction means that a state has the
ability to export its social policies to other states.38 Clearly, potential
importing states would be averse to such results and would therefore
be unwilling to commit to a universalist system.39
Assuming, for the moment, that states were willing to commit to
a universal insolvency system, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to implement universalism, even under the most favorable
conditions.4°  In a universalist regime, a prisoner's dilemma is
presented from the outset-the incentive to cooperate is outweighed
by the incentive to defect.41 Thus, even though states may know that
35. Id.; Balz, supra note 31, at 486 (insolvency has the "character of 'meta-law'
which modifies or supercedes practically all other branches of national legal
systems").
36. See Tung, supra note 2, at 52.
37. Id. at 48-49.
38. For example, assume the world consists of two states, State A and State B.
Firm B is a multinational corporation whose home state is State B, but it also has
operations in State A. Firm B falls into financial distress and files for bankruptcy in
State B. A universalist system would displace State A's bankruptcy law with State
B's bankruptcy law. The State B court would assert jurisdiction over assets, parties
and legal relationships wholly within State A. Universalism would also require State
A to recognize and enforce decisions rendered in the State B proceeding. Id. at 50-
51.
39. Id. at 49.
40. Id. at 47.
41. Professor Tung lays out the prisoner's dilemma as such: assume the world
consists of two states, A and B. Each state must choose an international bankruptcy
policy. Its two choices are universalism ("cooperation") or territoriality
("defection"). Firm A is a State A corporation; Firm B is a State B corporation.
Each corporation conducts business in the other state. Both corporations fall into
financial distress. Each state will prefer asserting its bankruptcy jurisdiction over all
of the corporation's assets, including those assets located in the other state. Thus
there are four possible combinations since they each have two policy choices
available. For each state, we can rank these four possible outcomes in relative order
of desirability, with 4 being a state's most favored outcome and 1 being the least
favored. In State A's best scenario, a ranking of 4, all its preferences are met. It
20041
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mutual cooperation will be most beneficial for all parties in a cross-
border insolvency, they still prefer to apply their own bankruptcy
laws to other laws. This creates the incentive to defect and open
territorial proceedings.42 Another reason states are predisposed to
defecting is because a state is always better off defecting regardless of
whether the other states cooperate or defect.43 This inevitably leads
to a territorial rather than universal administration of assets, which
undermines universalism's claimed efficiency advantage.44 Moreover,
a territorial administration will lead to a difference in treatment
between local and foreign creditors, thereby undermining
universalism's claimed advantage in a fairer distribution.4
Yet another disincentive to cooperate is attributed to the
vagueness of the home country standard. 6 It is more difficult to
determine the home country than universalists suggest because
oftentimes the country of incorporation, the country of headquarters
and the country with the largest share of the corporation's assets are
different. 47 Even if a home country is identifiable, a multinational
corporation can relatively easily shift its main center of interests to a
debtor-friendly jurisdiction given its size and scale, especially since
chooses territoriality (defects), while State B chooses universalism (cooperates).
Under this outcome, State B will defer to State A's assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction when a State A's insolvency proceeding involves Firm A operations or
assets in State B, and State A will not defer to State B's insolvency proceeding when
the roles are reversed, but will apply its own law. State A's next best perspective is
mutual cooperation and has a ranking of 3. Mutual cooperation means that State A
is willing to defer when State B is the home country, provided State B reciprocates.
After mutual cooperation comes mutual defection, which ranks at 2. State A's worst
scenario is if it chooses universalism (cooperates), while State B chooses territoriality
(defects). This outcome ranks the lowest at 1. State B will also have similar
preferences. Looking at all the outcomes, we can see that State A's best outcome is
also State B's worst outcome (and vice versa). Assuming that States A and B prefer
mutual cooperation to mutual defection, they will not achieve mutual cooperation
because each will instead choose to defect. This is the prisoner's dilemma wherein
the dominant strategy for both parties is defection. Id. at 57, 58. 60-63.
42. Id. at 55.
43. See supra text accompanying note 41.
44. Id. at 43; see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in
International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2230 (2000).
45. See Devling, supra note 13, at 437.
46. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 713-18.
47. See id.; see also Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Comment, With U.S. Interest in Mind, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 25, 36 (1997) (there is no comprehensive definition of "center of
debtor's main interest").
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there is nothing preventing corporations from doing so.48 Because the
home country standard can be strategically manipulated,
universalism's claimed advantage in greater predictability ex ante to
creditors is undermined.49
It is important to note, however, that the usual situation under a
prisoner's dilemma involves a single interaction between parties
involving a zero-sum decision. ° Where the situation involves repeat
interactions, the prospects for cooperative outcomes improve under
the prisoner's dilemma because the zero-sum nature of the outcome is
diminished.51 Repeat interactions have the effect of making states
realize that defecting in one round of interactions may result in
punishment in another round. 2 Therefore, states are less willing to
automatically defect and more willing to sacrifice immediate gains for
greater future payoffs.53 Despite the heightened prospects for a
cooperative outcome where repeat interactions are involved, the
possibility that a purely universalist regime will emerge still remains
unlikely because the variation in national bankruptcy laws are too
great and the notions of sovereignty too strong to create a universalist
regime.!
II. Competing Theories
In response to the problems of universalism, a number of
theories have emerged to offer more practical solutions for cross-
border insolvency issues: modified universalism, cooperative
territoriality, and contractualism.
A. Modified Universalism
Given that universalism provides an ideal system for cross-
border insolvency, a more practical version of universalism
emerged-modified universalism.55  While it is based on the
48. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 720, 722.
49. See id. at 708-09.
50. Tung, supra note 2, at 65.
51. Id. at 65-66.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Id. at 67.
54. See id.
55. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 725. Modified universalism is the term coined by
Professor Westbrook to describe the United States' version of universalism pursued
in United States Bankruptcy Code section 304, which outlines the United States
Bankruptcy Court's power when dealing with foreign proceedings. Id.; see also
2004]
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universalist principle that all the assets of an insolvent corporation
should be administered on a worldwide basis in a single proceeding,
modified universalism diverges from universalism in that it does not
demand automatic deference to the main proceeding.6 Instead, it
allows non-main proceeding states to decide whether to cooperate
based on the interests of local creditors. 7
Under this theory, the court in the jurisdiction where the
debtor's center of main interests is located appoints a representative
who is charged with the duty of gathering all the debtor's assets
wherever located. 8  If assets are located in another state, the
representative files an ancillary proceeding in the local courts in that
state, which is a limited proceeding whose purpose is to aid the main
proceeding. 9 If the local court determines that local creditors will be
treated fairly in the main proceeding, then the local court will protect
the debtor's assets from actions by local creditors and will turn them
over to the representative.60 If the local court makes the opposite
determination, it can elect not to cooperate and administer the assets
itself through a parallel proceeding.61
The fact that local courts can decide whether to defer to the main
proceeding is, on the one hand, a notable advantage of modified
universalism. 62 States are more willing to participate in a cross-border
insolvency system where they are not required to adhere to the orders
of a foreign court applying foreign law.63 On the other hand, the
ability of local courts to refuse cooperation is also a disadvantage of
this theory.64  It would be difficult to establish a cross-border
Devling, supra note 13, at 438.
56. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2301.
57. Id.
58. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 725-26.
59. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2300-01, 2303. An ancillary proceeding is
different from a parallel proceeding. The former is not a full domestic insolvency
proceeding, and "has as its central purpose rendering assistance to the foreign main
proceeding," whereas the latter is a full domestic insolvency proceeding and is
conducted without regard to other insolvency proceedings. Westbrook, supra note 6,
at 10.
60. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 10. Factors the court may consider in
determining whether to protect the debtor's assets from creditors' claims include
whether there will be just treatment of all creditors, the strength of the creditors'
interests and comity. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 727.
61. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 728.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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insolvency regime if a state can simply elect not to cooperate.65
However, the likelihood that a state will not cooperate is lessened by
the fact that the local court conditions the turnover of assets on
assurances by the representative of the main proceeding that he/she
will make a special distribution of those assets in a way that protects
the local creditors' interests. 66 Only if the representative accepts this
condition will the local court protect the assets from actions by local
creditors.67 This element of reciprocity protects the interests of non-
main proceeding state creditors in exchange for the protection or
relinquishment by the non-main proceeding states of a debtor's assets
located in non-main proceeding states.6'
B. Cooperative Territoriality
The principle of territoriality has long been the default rule
applicable to cross-border insolvency because it comports with the
prevailing notions of sovereignty.6 It is the idea that each state has
the exclusive right to administer the assets of a debtor located within
its own borders without regard to insolvency proceedings in other
jurisdictions. 7°  As such, no proceeding is considered main or
secondary but rather a parallel proceeding.7'
Since each state can seize and administer all assets located within
its borders, territoriality is often referred to as the "grab rule."72 The
result of having numerous parallel proceedings is a piecemeal and
premature administration of assets, which inevitably leads to lower
returns for all creditors.73  The need for a more coordinated
administration prompted the theory of cooperative territoriality. 74
65. Id. at 728-29.
66. Id. at 727.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See LoPucki, supra note 44, at 2218-19; Tung, supra note 2, at 39-40.
70. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 742.
71. Id. A secondary proceeding is really a subcategory of the parallel proceeding.
It may be understood as a parallel proceeding, that is a full local insolvency, which
goes beyond mere coordination' with other jurisdictions by requiring the local
proceeding and local law to defer in some respects to a foreign main proceeding.
Westbrook, supra note 6, at 11.
72. See Westbrook, supra note 6, at 8.
73. See Sean Hagan, Insolvency Reform and Economic Policy, 17 Conn. J. Int'l L.
63, 64 (2001); Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 Tex. Int'l L.J. 119, 123 (1998).
74. See generally LoPucki, supra note 3.
2004]
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Cooperative territoriality is like territoriality in that it recognizes a
state's right to administer the assets located within its borders without
regard to insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions.7 As such, the
theory allows for the opening of parallel proceedings, which
eliminates the tension between sovereign states by vesting each state
with bankruptcy jurisdiction congruent with its sovereignty.76
Cooperation among the parallel proceedings occurs through the
interaction of agents appointed by each of the states to represent the
bankruptcy estate on a case-by-case basis.77 Any inefficiencies or
conflicts between the parallel proceedings would be remedied
through the adoption of a treaty or a convention without attempting
to impose a new regime on sovereign states.78
Though cooperative territoriality may be consistent with the
prevailing notions of sovereignty, it does nothing to address the issue
of inefficiency in the territorial administration of assets. 79 Despite the
theory's cooperative characteristic, the fact remains that a debtor's
assets will be administered on a territorial basis, which invariably
leads to a piecemeal and premature administration as it did under the
predecessor theory of territoriality." Additionally, because
cooperative territoriality does not provide any standards for
cooperation among the appointed agents, the agents can cooperate as
little as they want, or refuse to cooperate altogether.8 Remedying
any conflicts through the adoption of a treaty or a convention would
only serve to increase administrative costs and delay the insolvency
proceedings. 8' Since cooperative territoriality fails to further either of
bankruptcy's primary goals, asset value maximization and equitable
distribution, it is unlikely to provide an effective cross-border
insolvency system.83
C. Contractualism
Contractualism, also known as the debtor's choice approach,
allows corporations to specify in their corporate charters the
75. See id. at 742-43.
76. See id. at 750.
77. See LoPucki, supra note 44, at 2219; Tung, supra note 2, at 42-43.
78. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 761; Tung, supra note 2, at 43.
79. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 750.
80. Hagan, supra note 73, at 64.
81. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 750.
82. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2309.
83. Id. at 2308.
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jurisdiction where the corporation's insolvency proceedings will be
held.84 Not only can the corporation select the jurisdiction, it can also
decide whether to have a territorial administration of assets. 8 If the
corporation opts for a universal approach, it will have all of its
constituent parts select the same jurisdiction to open insolvency
proceedings." If it opts for a territorial approach, the corporation will
have each of its constituent parts select the jurisdiction in which they
are incorporated. 87 A corporation can also select a hybrid approach in
which a select number of constituent parts all select the same
jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings while the remainder
selects the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated.8
Once a corporation specifies a jurisdiction and method of
administration, every bankruptcy court is bound to comply with that
selection.89 Contractualism's leading proponent, Professor Robert K.
Rasmussen, claims two advantages of this theory.90 First, he states
that contractualism encourages corporations to select a country with
the most efficient bankruptcy laws, which maximizes the value of the
insolvent corporation's assets and leaves more to distribute to
creditors. 9  Second, he states that contractualism deters forum
shopping because the corporation's country of bankruptcy
jurisdiction is fixed at the time of incorporation within its corporate
charter, which is a matter of public record. 2
These claimed advantages, however, are undermined by the fact
that corporations tend to select countries that are debtor-friendly
rather than efficient, and access to corporate charters is not as simple
as implied. 9 There are costs associated with obtaining a corporation's
charter, analyzing its provisions and then analyzing the specified
jurisdiction's bankruptcy laws.94 These costs can potentially preclude
84. Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private
Ordering, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2252, 2254 (2000); LoPucki, supra note 3, at 737.
85. Rasmussen, supra note 84, at 2254.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 737.
90. Id. at 737-38.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 738.
93. Id. at 739.
94. Id.
2004]
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smaller creditors from being able to pursue their claims." Moreover,
contractualism does nothing to prevent states, in the case where a
corporation opts for a universal approach, from opening territorial
proceedings. 96  Where a corporation selects a debtor-friendly
jurisdiction, other states will tend to open territorial proceedings for
fear that the debtor-friendly jurisdiction will not protect the interests
of local creditors. 97
D. Modified Universalism-The Most Workable Solution
Given that both cooperative territoriality and contractualism
serve to increase administrative costs while effecting an inefficient
administration of assets, they fail to provide a workable solution to
cross-border insolvency.98 Neither theory provides any means to
induce states that have assets of an insolvent corporation to cooperate
and realize a more efficient administration. 99 The level of cooperation
and coordination necessary to establish a cross-border insolvency
regime is best offered by modified universalism.1' It provides a solid
universalism framework to overcome the disincentives to cooperate
by providing for reciprocal treatment, as discussed in Part II.A, while
maintaining the flexibility to leave room for differences in conflicting
bankruptcy regimes. 1 In short, modified universalism provides the
most workable solution to address the complex issues of cross-border
insolvency.
III. European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings
In May 2000, the Council of Europe and the European
Commission adopted the EU Regulation to create an insolvency
regime that would effectively deal with cross-border insolvency in a
cooperative fashion. 1°2 The EU Regulation, which took effect on May
31, 2002, was the product of a long line of attempts at creating an
95. See id.
96. See generally Rasmussen, supra note 84.
97. See Tung, supra note 2, at 45-46.
98. See generally Westbrook, supra note 8; LoPucki, supra note 3.
99. Id.
100. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2277.
101. Id.
102. See Peter J. Murphy, Why Won't the Leaders Lead? The Need for National
Governments to Replace Academics and Practitioners in the Effort to Reform the
Muddled World of International Insolvency, 34 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 121, 137
(2002); see generally Council Regulation, supra note 10.
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insolvency regime. °3  Its purpose is to create a cross-border
insolvency system based on common rules of mutuality and
cooperation.O The EU Regulation applies to all collective insolvency
proceedings that entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor,
who has its center of main interests in a Member state, and the
appointment of a liquidator. 1 °6 Although not expressly stated, the
103. Cross-border insolvency has been an issue in the European Community
dating back to the 1960s. The issue of cross-border insolvency was first raised in the
1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Brussels Treaty). Although the Brussels Treaty did not
specifically address the issue, it prompted discussions regarding the need for a
European bankruptcy convention that would provide for mutual recognition and
cooperation in cross-border insolvencies. By 1980, the European Economic
Community issued an initial draft proposal for a European convention, but the
proposal was set aside due to fierce opposition. In 1990, the Council of Europe
revived the notion of having a bankruptcy convention with the Istanbul Convention,
but this effort also led to disappointing results. Consequently, the European
Economic Community Council of Ministers appointed the Working Group on
Bankruptcy to draft another convention. The result was the 1995 Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings. The Convention, which was considered a milestone,
established jurisdictional rules for the Member states, choice-of-law rules, rules for
cooperation and the possibility of opening secondary proceedings. Despite the
enthusiasm surrounding the Convention, only fourteen of the fifteen Member states
signed on, the United Kingdom being the only non-signatory due to the territorial
dispute over Gibraltar at the time. In May 2000, however, the Council of Europe and
the European Commission adopted the EU Regulation, which was almost identically
worded as the EU Convention. See Balz, supra note 31, at 489-496; Michael Butter,
English Fixed and Floating Charges in German Insolvency Proceedings: Unsolved
Problems Under the New European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 2002 Sing.
J. Legal Stud. 271, 273-74 (2002).
104. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, THE EU REGULATION ON
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS (2004), available at
<www.freshfields.com/practice/finance/publications> [hereinafter FRESHFIELDS].
105. Liquidator is defined as any person or body whose function is to administer
or liquidate assets of which the debtor has been divested or to supervise the
administration of his affairs. Those persons and bodies who qualify as liquidators
according to each Member state are listed in Annex C of the EU Regulation.
Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 2(b), Annex C.
106. In all, the EU Regulation applies to fifty-two types of insolvency proceedings
and fifty-eight types of liquidators in fourteen countries (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom) speaking approximately twenty different languages. Denmark
opted out of the EU Regulation, but has indicated that it will introduce parallel
legislation. Bob Wessels, The European Union Insolvency Regulation: An Overview
With Trans-Atlantic Elaborations, 2003 Ann. Surv. Bankr. L. 481, 483-84 (2003),;
FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 2. Additionally, the EU Regulation does not apply
to insolvency proceedings concerning insurance undertakings, credit institutions,
investment undertakings which provide services involving the holding of funds or
securities for third parties, or to collective investment undertakings. Council
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EU Regulation is based on the universalist principle of one law, one
court. ° However, since it allows for the opening of secondary
proceedings, it does not pursue a purely universal approach but
rather a hybrid approach between universalism and territorialism.'
A. Main Features
The EU Regulation provides for the following: (1) determining
the jurisdiction of the main insolvency proceedings;'O' (2) choice-of-
law rules; 0 (3) ensuring the recognition and enforcement of
judgments; (4) providing for the possibility of secondary
proceedings;" (5) creating duties for liquidators in multiple
proceedings to communicate and cooperate;13 and (6) guaranteeing
information for creditors and their rights to make claims. 114 Each of
these features will be discussed in order.
1. Jurisdiction of the Main Proceeding
Article 3(1) of the EU Regulation states that the Member state
in which a debtor has its "cent[er] of main interests" has jurisdiction
to open the main insolvency proceeding. 5 The preamble to the EU
Regulation defines the center of main interests as corresponding to
the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his
interests on a regular basis such that it is ascertainable by third
parties.11 6 In the case of a company or a legal person, the presumption
is that the center of main interests is the place of registered office, but
this presumption is rebuttable.17
The main proceeding, which can either be a reorganization or a
winding-up proceeding, has universal scope because it aims to
encompass and administer all of the debtor's assets.1 8 One of the
Regulation, supra note 10, art. 1(2).
107. Leucke, supra note 19, at 373.
108. See generally Council Regulation, supra note 10.
109. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 3.
110. Id. art. 4.
111. Id. art. 15 & 16.
112. Id. art. 27.
113. Id. art. 31.
114. Id. art. 40.
115. Id. art. 3(1).
116. Id. pmbl. 13.
117. Id. art. 3(1).
118. Id. pmbl. 12; FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 4.
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initial duties of the main court is to appoint an insolvency officer
holder, known as the liquidator, who is empowered with the authority
to administer or liquidate the debtor's assets or supervise the
administration of the assets. 9 The scope of the liquidator's powers is
set out in Article 18.120
2. Choice-of-law Rules
The law applicable to the main proceeding, referred to as the lex
concursus, is the law of the Member state in which the proceeding
was opened.' The law of the state of the opening of the proceeding
determines all of the substantive and procedural aspects of the
proceeding from the opening to its conduct and closure.l22 Thus the
lex concursus of one Member state is exported to another Member
state. 23 There are, however, some exceptions to the application of the
lex concursus in certain situations, which are laid out in Articles 5 to
15 of the Regulation.' 24
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
Article 16 provides for the automatic recognition of the
judgment opening the main insolvency proceeding handed down by a
court of a Member state."'n As discussed below, automatic
recognition of the opening of the main proceeding does not preclude
the possibility of opening a secondary proceeding.i 6  Automatic
recognition means that the opening of the main proceeding yields the
same effect in other Member states as under the law of the state
where the proceeding was opened.l 27  Therefore, automatic
recognition of the main proceeding cannot be challenged by other
Member states in their local courts except where recognition would
be manifestly contrary to public policy or where a secondary
proceeding is opened.'2n
119. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 2(b); FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at
4.
120. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 18.
121. Id. art. 4(1); Wessels, supra note 106, at 484.
122. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 4(2); Wessels, supra note 106, at 484.
123. Wessels, supra note 106, at 487.
124. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 5-15.
125. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 16(1).
126. Id. art. 16(2).
127. Id. art. 17; FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 9.
128. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 26(6); FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at
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Another important effect of the universality of the main
proceeding is that the appointment of the liquidator in the main
proceeding, as well the liquidator's powers, is automatically
recognized in all other Member states.'2 9 Accordingly, the liquidator
can exercise all the powers conferred to him by the laws of the state
of the opening of the main proceeding in all other Member states.'
30
4. Secondary Proceedings
Because of the widely differing substantive insolvency laws
within the European Community, the Council of Europe decided it
was not practical to have insolvency proceedings with universal
scope. 1'' As such, the Council opted to have a hierarchy of
proceedings: a main proceeding of universal scope and local
proceedings of territorial scope.' 32 The local proceedings are of two
types depending on whether they are opened prior to or after the
commencement of the main proceedings. 33 If opened prior to the
main proceeding, the local proceeding is considered an independent
territorial proceeding, which can take the form of either a
reorganization or a winding-up proceeding; if opened after, it is
considered a secondary proceeding, which is limited to a winding-up
proceeding.' 34 Independent territorial proceedings can be converted
to a secondary proceeding when a main proceeding is opened upon
the request of the liquidator in the main proceeding and if conversion
would be in the interests of the creditors in the main proceeding.
Secondary proceedings can be requested by either the main
liquidator or any other person or authority empowered under the
domestic law in the state in which the secondary proceeding is
requested, but only if the debtor has an "establishment" in that
9.
129. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 7.
130. Id.
131. Council Regulation, supra note 10, pmbl. 11.
132. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104; Wessels, supra note 106, at 500-01.
133. Id.
134. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 4, 6. One of two conditions must be met
before opening an insolvency proceeding: the proceeding must have been requested
by a creditor resident, habitually domiciled or with a registered office in the other
members state, where the claim arises from the operation of the debtor's
establishment in that state; or, the main insolvency proceeding cannot be opened
because of conditions laid down by local law in the state in which the debtor's center
of main interests is situated. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 6.
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Member state. 136 Establishment is defined as any place of operations
where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with
human means and goods.' Such proceedings serve one of two
purposes: to protect the interests of local creditors or to aid and
support the main proceeding.lm
Since the secondary proceeding is territorial in scope, its effects
are limited to those assets within the state of the opening of
secondary proceedings and to the recovery of assets removed from
the state in which such proceedings were opened. 39 Pursuant to
Article 28, the law of the state of the opening of secondary
proceedings is the applicable law, that is the lex concursus, with
respect to the lodging of claims in that state.' 4 As in the main
proceeding, the court in the secondary proceeding also appoints a
liquidator whose responsibilities are like those of the main liquidator,
but whose scope of authority is limited to those assets within the state
of the opening of secondary proceedings.141  The secondary
proceeding, however, is not completely free from the main
proceeding's control. 42 The Council of Europe's intent was to have
the main proceeding play a dominant role and thus allowed for
possibilities for the main liquidator to intervene in the secondary
proceedings, such as applying for the realization of assets in the
secondary proceeding to be suspended or staying the secondary
proceeding altogether. 43
5. Duty to Communicate and Cooperate
Although the Council of Europe decided to have secondary
proceedings run parallel to the main proceeding, it realized that in
order to achieve the effective administration of all a debtor's assets,
the main and secondary proceedings had to be coordinated.1 " Thus in
Article 31, the Council established the rule that main and secondary
liquidators are duty bound to cooperate and communicate
136. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 29.
137. Id. art. 2(h).
138. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 6; Wessels, supra note 106, at 501.
139. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 27; FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 6.
140. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 28; Wessels, supra note 106, at 491.
141. Wessels, supra note 106, at 490.
142. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, pmbl. 20, art. 33.
143. Id.
144. Id. pmbl. 19-20; FRESHFIELDS, supra 104, at 6.
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information to each other. 45 Article 31 further provides that the
secondary liquidator must give the main liquidator an early
opportunity to submit proposals on the liquidation or use of assets in
the main proceeding.'4 This provision is in line with the Council's
intent on having the main proceeding (and the main liquidator) play
the dominant role in cross-border insolvencies despite the fact that
the main and secondary proceedings are parallel proceedings. 47
Another means of ensuring the main proceeding's dominance is
the main liquidator's ability to request a stay of the secondary
proceedings, in whole or in part, for a period of up to three months.
1
Such a request may only be rejected if it is manifestly of no interest to
the creditors in the main proceeding.149 The court in the secondary
proceeding may, however, require the main liquidator to take
measures guaranteeing the interests of the creditors in the secondary
proceeding.'o
6. Creditors' Rights
Any creditor with a habitual residence, domicile or registered
office in a Member state, including tax and social security authorities,
has the right to lodge a claim in the main proceeding and any
secondary proceedings in writing.' Article 32 requires main and
secondary liquidators to lodge claims in each other's proceedings so
long as their respective creditors' interests are furthered.'52 The
Article further empowers the main and secondary liquidators to
participate in the each other's proceedings on the same basis as
creditors.53
Once insolvency proceedings, whether main or secondary, are
opened in a Member state, the court of that state or the appointed
145. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 31(1), (2); Wessels, supra note 106, at
493.
146. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 31(3).
147. Wessels, supra note 106, at 493; FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104. at 6.
148. The stay can also be continued or renewed for similar periods. Council
Regulation, supra note 10, art. 33(1).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. arts. 39, 32(1),
152. Id. art. 32(2). This situation, where each liquidator has the right to file
creditor claims in each other's proceeding, is what Professor Westbrook has termed
universal cross filing. See Jay L. Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 Tex. Int'l L.J. 27
(1998).
153. Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 32(3).
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liquidator must immediately provide individual notice to known
creditors who have their habitual residences, domiciles or registered
offices in a Member state of the opening of the proceedings."
Although publication of the opening of proceedings in other Member
states is not a prior condition for recognition of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, for business purposes, the main contents of the judgment
opening the proceedings should be published in other Member states
at the request of the liquidator.'55 However, any Member state in
which the debtor has an establishment may require mandatory
publication.96
B. Positive Aspects of the EU Regulation
By placing the insolvency rules and procedures in a regulation, as
opposed to a directive, the EU Regulation was automatically binding
on Member states without the aid of any implementing legislation.'57
This supranational application of the EU Regulation was what, in all
likelihood, ensured its success as opposed to the EU Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings, which required Member states to sign on to
it before it became law.58
Another positive aspect of the EU Regulation is its choice-of-law
provision.15 9 Rather than creating a uniform body of bankruptcy laws,
which would only create conflicts among sovereign states, the Council
of Europe instead focused on simplifying the procedural aspects of
cross-border insolvency.16° Having a clear and concise rule based on
161the lex concursus principle avoids needless conflict and litigation.
The EU Regulation's provisions dealing with the recognition of
insolvency proceedings also furthers its universalist goals and
154. Id. art. 40(1). The notice must include time limits, the penalties laid down in
regard to those time limits, the body or authority empowered to accept the lodgment
of claims and the other measures laid down. Id. art. 40(2).
155. Id. pmbl. 29; Wessels, supra note 106, at 490. If there is a publication, it must
specify who was appointed as liquidator and whether it is a main or secondary
proceeding. The publication can also include the judgment appointing the liquidator.
Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 21(1).
156. Id. art. 21(2).
157. Murphy, supra note 102, at 137-38.
158. See id. (this unique supranational application of law onto the insolvency laws
of sovereign nations can serve as a model); European Union Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996).
159. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 4.
160. Murphy, supra note 102, at 139.
161. See id.
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constitute another one of its positive aspects. 62 In lieu of petitioning
each court in every state in which an insolvent corporation has assets,
the EU Regulation provides for automatic recognition and immediate
effect of the judgment opening the main proceedings as well as the
appointment of the main liquidator.' 6  Once such a judgment is
rendered, it precludes all other Member states from opening a main
proceeding.' 64 This virtually ensures the universal effect of the main
proceeding throughout the European Community. 16' However,
automatic recognition does not preclude the opening of secondary
proceedings, which limits the universal effect of the main
proceeding. 66
Although secondary proceedings have this effect, their
availability is another one of the EU Regulation's positive aspects
because it reflects a balanced and workable approach to deal with
cross-border insolvency. 67 The EU Regulation's universalist goals are
not completely undermined by the availability of secondary
proceedings because a Member state must first show that the
insolvent corporation has an establishment in that state as a
precondition of opening a secondary proceeding. 68  Even if a
secondary proceeding is opened, the EU Regulation provides the
possibilities for main liquidators to intervene in the secondary
proceeding and ensure the main proceeding's dominance.' 69 The fact
that the EU Regulation allows for the opening of secondary
proceedings demonstrates its workability-while it establishes fixed
policies and procedures, the EU Regulation leaves room for the
differences in bankruptcy laws among the Member states.7 ° This
flexibility will foster cooperative results since states will be more apt
to cooperate when they are not coerced to do so. 7'
C. Negative Aspects of the EU Regulation
Although the EU Regulation's flexibility is one of its most
162. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 16, 17.
163. Id.; Westbrook, supra note 6, at 33.
164. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 34.
165. Id.
166. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 16(2).
167. Fletcher, supra note 73, at 124.
168. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 3(2).
169. Id. pmbl. 20, art. 33.
170. See Murphy, supra note 102, at 139.
171. Id. at 140.
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positive aspects, it actually undermines the Regulation's universalist
goals.172 For example, one means by which Member states can avoid
cooperating is by showing that the assets located within their borders
belong to a locally owned subsidiary. 173 The EU Regulation does not
address the insolvency of locally owned subsidiaries because they
constitute separate corporate entities; it only addresses
establishments, which are branches of parent corporations and so are
not considered separate entities.'74 Since subsidiaries are treated as
separate entities, each would be the subject of a different set of main
insolvency proceedings. 75 If multinational corporations cannot make
this showing, they still have the opportunity to prove the existence of
an establishment and the corporation's home state will open
secondary proceedings.'76 The task of proving an establishment is
made easier because of the term's vagueness, which means the term
can be manipulated.' 77
The term establishment is just one of several vague terms in the
EU Regulation.78 Other terms such as "cent[er] of main interest" and
"public policy" are also prone to manipulation. 7 9 To ensure the EU
Regulation's universal scope, such terms must retain the same
meaning in all Member states because if they do not carry a consistent
meaning throughout the European Community, their application will
give rise to interpretational disputes'8s Because the EU Regulation
does not provide for any procedures in case of interpretational
disputes, they are left to the resolution of the Member states.
l1 l
Although states are obligated to interpret the EU Regulation in
accordance with established EU principles of statutory interpretation,
inconsistent interpretations will inevitably arise, which could lead to
the referral of the matter to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ").'12
172. See Tung, supra note 2, at 97.
173. See Butter, supra note 103, at 282-83.
174. Id.
175. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 3.
176. See Butter, supra note 103, 281-83.
177. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 2(h). Establishment is defined as
any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic
activity with human means and goods. Id.
178. See Wessels, supra note 106, at 494.
179. Id.
180. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 5; Butter, supra note 103, at 276, 281.
181. FRESHFIELDS, supra note 104, at 5.
182. Id. "According to article 234 of the European Community Treaty, there is a
mandatory reference to the E.C.J. to resolve problems of interpretation within the
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If the matter is referred to the ECJ, there is a risk of a two-year stay
on any insolvency proceedings while the ECJ renders it decision.' 83
Referral could be avoided, however, if the courts of the Member
states instead used their discretion to resolve the interpretational
dispute themselves.' 8'
Although the wide discretion granted to Member states has the
potential to foster cooperation, it can also be used to hinder it,
especially if states use their discretion to open secondary
proceedings.' Secondary proceedings hinder the universality of the
EU Regulation because they provide too great a disincentive to
cooperate 86 The Regulation's provisions for automatic recognition
and enforcement of judgments are binding on Member states only to
the extent that they do not open secondary proceedings.' Once a
state opens a secondary proceeding, it is no longer bound to recognize
or enforce the judgment opening the main proceeding.n Though the
EU Regulation attempts to protect the dominance of the main
proceeding, in particular by providing for a stay of the secondary
proceeding, this attempt is nearly futile because the court of the
secondary proceeding can terminate the stay by its own motion if the
stay is no longer justified by the interests of local creditors.189 Given
that it will almost always be in the local creditors' interests to
adjudicate their claims in a local, rather than a foreign, proceeding,
the incentive to cooperate disappears and the EU Regulation's
universalist goals are rendered obsolete.' 90
D. The EU Regulation and Modified Universalism
Having surveyed some of the EU Regulation's main provisions
and having examined its positive and negative aspects, the EU
Regulation does not provide enough incentive to induce cooperation
in cross-border insolvencies.' 91 This is attributable to the availability
scope of the Regulation." Butter, supra note 103, at 281.
183. Id. at 281.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 277, 281.
186. See Tung, supra note 2, at 98.
187. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 16(2).
188. See Wessels, supra note 106, at 488.
189. See Council Regulation, supra note 10, art. 33(2).
190. See Tung, supra note 2, at 98.
191. See generally Council Regulation, supra note 10; Wessels, supra note 106.
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of secondary proceedings. 92 Secondary proceedings frustrate the EU
Regulation's objective of creating a cross-border insolvency system
based on mutuality and cooperation because they provide an
opportunity to evade the main proceeding and avoid automatic
recognition. 93 Despite the fact that the EU Regulation imposes an
obligation on the state of the opening of secondary proceedings to
cooperate with the main proceeding and render assistance to it, there
is nothing to prevent the state of the secondary proceeding to refuse
to cooperate if cooperation would conflict with the interests of local
creditors. 94 As such, rather than a potential universal administration
of assets, the EU Regulation is limited to realizing a territorial
administration since the incentive to defect outweighs the incentive to
cooperate. 195
What the EU Regulation lacks is some element of reciprocity to
induce cooperation 96  When a non-main proceeding state is
considering whether to open a secondary proceeding, it will usually
balance future payoff of cooperating with the main proceeding versus
the immediate gain of opening its own proceeding. 97  When
contemplating future payoffs, the state will take into account the
possibility that in the future, it might be the main state seeking
assistance from the state that is currently seeking its assistance.' 98 This
may induce the non-main proceeding state to defer to the main
proceeding, but only if the non-main proceeding state could be
assured that the main state would also defer in the situation where the
positions were reversed.' 99 Because the EU Regulation does not
provide for such an assurance, it follows that non-main proceeding
states will, more often than not, opt to open secondary proceedings."
It could, however, be said that the assurance of mutual deference
is implicit in the EU Regulation since the European Union itself was
established to promote cooperation and mutuality.20' Thus, whenever
Member states deal with one another, they are bound to act on the
192. See Wessels, supra note 106, at 500.
193. Id. at 6.
194. See generally Council Regulation, supra note 10.
195. See Tung, supra note 2, at 63, 77.
196. See generally Council Regulation, supra note 10.
197. See Tung, supra note 2, at 67.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 97.
201. Id.
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basis of reciprocity. Unfortunately, just because there is a system in
place designed to enhance cooperation does not necessarily mean
that the system will yield cooperative results, especially in the area of
bankruptcy law.2 Given that bankruptcy is one of the areas of law
least amenable to international harmonization and cooperation, the
EU Regulation cannot solely rely on the probability that Member
states' sense of community will induce them to defer to the main
insolvency proceeding.2 The EU Regulation must explicitly provide
for some kind of reciprocity for it to have any possibility of
overcoming the strong incentive of states to defect and open
secondary proceedings.2
The most optimal means of achieving this end would be to omit
the availability of secondary proceedings and have the EU
Regulation pursue a strictly modified universalist approach. Under
this approach, the court of the Member state in which the insolvent
corporation has its center of main interests would, as before, open the
insolvency proceeding and appoint a liquidator, or representative, to
gather all the corporation's assets wherever located." As for assets
located in other Member states, the liquidator would file an ancillary
proceeding in the local courts in each of those states requesting them
to turn over the debtor's assets.2°7 The local courts would then decide
whether to turn the assets over to the liquidator based on the interests
of local creditors." If the local courts determine that local creditors
would not be treated fairly in the main proceeding, they will refuse to
turn the assets over and will instead open parallel proceedings and
administer the assets themselves. 2° If the local courts determine that
local creditors would be treated fairly in the main proceeding, they
can then condition the protection of those assets within their
jurisdiction from local creditors' claims on the main liquidator's
assurance that there will be a special distribution of those assets in a
way that protects the local creditors' interests.1
Even though Member states can still elect not to cooperate, that
202. Id.
203. Id. at 69-70.
204. Id. at 47.
205. Id. at 63.
206. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 726.
207. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2300-01.
208. Id. at 2301.
209. Id.
210. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 727.
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is unlikely because the reciprocity that modified universalism
provides creates an incentive to cooperate that outweighs the
incentive to defect.1  More specifically, because Member states will
interact often, each state will tend to be more careful in deciding
whether or not to cooperate. 2 Repeat interactions coupled with the
main liquidator's assurance of fair treatment of local creditors tip the
balance in favor of cooperating now so that in the future, the Member
states may enjoy the same level of deference.213 Moreover, the EU
Regulation will still be able to retain its flexibility in pursuing a
modified universal approach because it will still allow Member states
to choose whether or not to cooperate.2 4
Conclusion
As economies continue to globalize, the need for cooperation in
cross-border insolvency will become even greater as issues become
more complex. Universalism may be a theoretically ideal system for
cross-border insolvency, but its principles are unworkable in the
present international system. Given the level of deference that
universalism demands and bankruptcy's wholesale effects, states are
unwilling to undermine their sovereignty to commit to a universalist
system. Since universalism fails to render the requisite level of
cooperation, other theories have emerged to provide a cross-border
insolvency system. Of these theories, modified universalism presents
the most workable approach. It induces states to cooperate because a
non-main proceeding state will defer to a main state with the
expectation that the main proceeding state will defer in a like manner
when their respective roles are reversed. The main proceeding state
has every incentive to fulfill that expectation because when it finds
itself being the non-main proceeding state, it can also expect
deference when it becomes a main state again in the future. This
reciprocal cooperation facilitates a single unified administration of a
debtor's assets, which in turn promotes bankruptcy's primary
objectives.
If the EU Regulation pursued modified universalism, it would
enhance its prospects for creating an effective cross-border insolvency
system. To do this, the EU Regulation must first omit the availability
211. See Tung, supra note 2, at 63.
212. Id. at 67.
213. Id.
214. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2277.
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of secondary proceedings because it hinders its chances for effecting a
unified administration of assets. It will retain its flexibility in that it
will still allow sovereign states to choose whether or not to cooperate.
However, states will be assured of reciprocal treatment, which
reduces the likelihood that states will not cooperate. The European
Community, due to the existing relationships among the Member
states, is capable of and should pursue that sort of reciprocal
cooperation.
